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Abstract   Current rationalization options for West Coast groundfish trawl fisheries 
include significant allocations of harvester quota to processors, justified as com-
pensation for “stranded capital.”  This article discusses the origin of the concept of 
stranded capital, its use in other policy settings, preconditions, measurement, and 
remedies for addressing it. Our main finding is that rationalization of fisheries is 
unlikely to generate significant processing stranded capital. Most capital involved 
in fisheries processing is malleable and not likely to be devalued as a result of ratio-
nalization. If policy makers nevertheless judge it desirable to consider compensation, 
a legitimate process would tie compensation to anticipated or demonstrated capital 
losses. Current policies proposed on the U.S. West Coast to transfer harvester quota 
are arbitrary and unsupported by empirical estimates of the magnitude of the prob-
lem. They are likely to generate important spillover effects that could negate some of 
the intended benefits of rationalization. 
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introduction
The issue of “stranded capital” has arisen in recent and ongoing fisheries rationalization 
policy debates on the Pacific Coast. Both the West Coast groundfish and whiting trawl 
fisheries are under consideration for rationalization using individual fishing quotas (IFQs) 
and cooperatives (coops), respectively. As is always the case, heated debate has arisen 
over the initial allocation of IFQs. But in this case, the debate is over more than just the 
allocation of historical catch record-based shares among vessel permit holders. In par-
ticular, the Pacific Fisheries Management Council (PFMC) is currently debating whether 
some of the initial quota shares ought to be allocated directly to seafood processors. Cur-
rent options under consideration by the PFMC include plans that would allocate 25% of 
the nonwhiting groundfish quota shares to processors and 50% of the whiting quota to 
shoreside processors.1 
  The allocation of initial harvester quota shares to processors is a new and potentially 
precedent-setting concept in fisheries policy and one that deserves close examination. 
The options under current consideration on the West Coast have been introduced at the 
behest of processors, who argue that fisheries rationalization will cause large reductions 
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in the value of their existing processing capital. The argument is then that the allocation of 
harvester quota is necessary to compensate them for these “stranded capital” losses. Current 
processor allocation options under consideration involve enormous amounts of compensa-
tion, on the order of $100 million. In addition, the proposed processor allocation remedies 
may generate structural impacts, such as altering ex-vessel market competition and incen-
tives for innovation, which will influence the intended benefits from rationalization. It is 
thus worth examining whether the problem these options are intended to address is actually 
a problem of substance and whether proposed remedies fit the alleged problem at hand. 
  This article surveys and synthesizes the literature on stranded capital and then dis-
cusses its applicability in fisheries. The next section defines and discusses the origin of 
the concept and surveys the manner in which stranded capital has been treated in settings 
other than fisheries. The third section discusses preconditions necessary to generate sig-
nificant amounts of stranded capital. The fourth section discusses how the stranded capital 
concept got injected into fisheries debates. The fifth section discusses how we might mea-
sure stranded capital costs and remedies available to address stranded capital.  The sixth 
section discusses issues of the process that are important to ensuring legitimacy, and the 
final section concludes. 
Origins of the Concept of stranded Capital
In the 1980s, the ascendancy of the free-market-oriented Reagan administration paved 
the way for the wave of deregulation that opened trucking, airlines, railroads, banking, 
natural gas production, and telecommunications to competitive pressures. The results of 
deregulation were disruptive to incumbents during the transition. All of the industries 
deregulated in the 1980s wave found need to adjust as a result of deregulation (Winston 
1998). Large interstate trucking firms had too many trucks in their fleets and needed to 
divest, whereas smaller local firms consolidated and merged. Airlines reallocated their 
fleets and other facilities over the routing system in response to new entrants and incum-
bent consolidation. Banks and railroads merged and reformed as they found themselves 
with capital structures ill-suited to the new market realities imposed by competition 
in the marketplace. All of this restructuring occurred relatively quickly with minimal 
disruption because the capital in question was mobile, flexible, and easily moved, re-
configured, consolidated, and divested. While many firms adjusted capital structure in 
response to deregulation, none claimed that capital had been “stranded,” and none asked 
for or received compensation for capital values that were influenced by changes associ-
ated with deregulation (Tye and Graves 1997). The dominant precedent of deregulation 
history in the U.S.A. has thus been to deregulate without consideration of compensation 
for transition costs.
   It was not until electricity generation began to be deregulated in the early 1990s 
that the concept of stranded costs first appeared in regulatory discussions (Maloney, 
McCormick, and Sauer 1997). Electricity generators historically have been granted lo-
cal monopoly rights to be sole providers in various regions, subject to regulations on 
the maximum consumer prices that could be charged. Prices in regulated utility markets 
have been set by utility rate commissions that determine utility rates by enumerating the 
financial value of generator assets and costs and then computing “fair” prices that guaran-
tee a fixed rate of return on invested capital. Under this regulatory system, many utilities 
made investments in high-cost nuclear power-generating facilities, long-term contracts to 
purchase high-cost power, and other expenses intended to be paid through rate surcharges 
over long periods of time. These investments in facilities, contracts, and commitments 
have become the issue of contention as electricity markets become candidates for de-
regulation. In particular, in markets opened up to competition among many rather than 
just one provider, competition increases, putting pressure on incumbents to improve ef-Stranded Capital 3
ficiency and reduce electricity prices.2 Utilities that are no longer guaranteed price floors 
that translate into fair rates of return for investments claim that their investments are 
“stranded” by deregulation and that they should be compensated for the costs associated 
with such stranded capital. 
  Utilities subject to deregulation have argued that they be granted remedies for three 
types of costs: (i) investments in generation facilities that become less profitable under de-
regulation; (ii) obligations mandated by prior regulations that may not be recovered under 
deregulation;  (iii) debt incurred to finance programs for various social objectives, such as 
efficient appliance rebate programs (U.S. C.B.O. 1998). For the most part, regulators have 
accepted arguments over (ii) and (iii), namely that obligations incurred to address mandated 
social objectives should be compensated. But there has been heated debate and litigation 
over whether investments in less profitable generation facilities should be compensated. 
Most of the high-profile contested cases involve compensation demands for expensive nu-
clear power plants, which, as will be discussed below, have some unique features (Maloney, 
McCormick, and Sauer 1997). Utilities have used at least two legal arguments to support 
their claims, including that deregulation involves a “takings” of asset values and that util-
ity regulation involves an implicit “contract” that guarantees against devaluation of assets 
(Baumol and Sidak 1995a,b; Brennan and Boyd 1997; Boyd and Brennan 1996; Boyd 
1998; Sidak and Spulber 1997; and Rossi 1998). Both the “takings” and the “implicit con-
tract” legal arguments have been rejected by the courts.3 Arguments against compensation 
have held that generating capital decisions are discretionary and made with the understand-
ing that there are risks of deregulation. Prudent decision makers should not be surprised by 
deregulation or caught financially exposed with significant redundant capital. Moreover, 
investments made in the face of such deregulation risk would already be expected to be 
earning above-normal returns to compensate for the risk (cf. Hovenkamp 1999; Van Doren 
1998) and hence compensation would be conferring double rewards. 
 
stranded Capital in Fisheries: alaska and the Pacific Coast Cases
How has the concept of stranded capital, an issue heretofore largely related to de-
regulation of electricity markets, been injected into debates over West Coast fisheries 
rationalization?   A look back through the history of West Coast rationalization suggests 
that it is essentially the most recent incarnation of a succession of efforts by processors 
in Pacific fisheries (mainly Alaska) to assert claims to initial allocations in rationaliza-
tion. This effort has its origins in work on so-called “equitable rights-based” schemes 
promoted by economist Scott Matulich, work that was first published in Matulich, Mit-
telhammer, and Reberte (MMR) in 1996.4 That paper begins with a demonstration how, 
under specific preconditions, rationalizing a fishery may temporarily amplify the compe-
tition for raw fish among processors with excess capacity, driving ex-vessel prices above 
2 Or, more accurately, the original expectation of proponents of deregulation was that prices would fall. The 
reality has been somewhat more complicated, with some evidence that deregulation has forced incumbents to 
produce electricity more efficiently (Fabrizio et al. 2007), and less evidence that cost savings are passed on to 
consumers.
3 “Takings” occur when a government deprives a landowner of all productive uses of the land. Courts have con-
sistently argued that even large losses in potential economic value do not constitute a taking as long as a user 
retains some use of the land. As argued in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Concrete Pipe and Products vs. Con-
struction Laborers Pension Trust in 1993, “…our cases have long established that mere diminution in the value 
of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking…those who do business in [a] regulated 
field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative 
end…legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expec-
tations.”
4 “My name is Professor Scott Matulich...and I am the progenitor of equitable rights-based fisheries manage-
ment, including the use of processor quotas”  (Matulich 2004).Wilen 4
their long-term values during the adjustment after rationalization. The paper then ends with 
the inference that, under other specialized preconditions, such amplified competition could 
last forever, stranding assets by reducing the return below that expected by investors. 
  Over the last decade, Alaskan processing industry lobbyists have seized on the MMR 
findings and used them to support pleas for various special concessions during rational-
ization. Their impassioned lobbying has employed hyperbole, a sense of entitlement and 
outrage, and veiled threats of process hold-up. For example, one representative has stated, 
“simply put, you do not need all of the harvesting and processing capacity that exists when 
an overcapitalized fishery is rationalized. Primary processing plants and fishing vessels 
become nearly worthless. Both fishing vessel owners and processing plant owners should, 
therefore, receive rights in a rationalized fishery as compensation for having the value of 
their existing investments expropriated by the new management system” [italics added].5  
MMR assert that “the regulatory expropriation resulting from a harvester-only allocation 
of quota constitutes a ‘denial of reasonable investment-backed expectations,’ which is argu-
ably a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution” [italics added]. Matulich 
and Sever (1999) warn that “whenever the initial allocation is perceived to redistribute 
status quo ante wealth, politically powerful interest groups may form to block a switch to 
ITQ management, jeopardizing the efficiency benefits of rights-based management.”  The 
“politically powerful interest groups,” of course, are the processors and their lobbyists.
  Before discussing the manner in which these conceptual ideas have been used to in-
fluence policy in the Pacific, it is worth emphasizing the preconditions that are required to 
generate the MMR results. The deductions rest critically on several assumptions, namely:   
(i) policy changes are completely unanticipated so that the post-rationalization fishery 
has significant overcapacity; (ii) that there are enough processors to guarantee vigor-
ous ex-vessel price competition; and (iii) that the excess capital is non-malleable with 
no alternative uses. If all of these preconditions are met, then it is theoretically possible 
that ex-vessel prices might be bid up temporarily during the period in which the industry 
divests itself of excess capacity.6 This transition period would end after the excess capital 
is depreciated out. In addition, if one believes that capital is infinitely durable, then transi-
tion losses will be capitalized into permanent reductions in asset values.
  In the real world of fisheries, none of the MMR preconditions are likely to hold 
in fact. First, it is highly unlikely that fisheries processors would approach rationaliza-
tion with “significant overcapacity.” Policy changes like rationalization take time (years 
in fact) to implement, and are thus anticipated and adjusted to in advance.7 Only naïve 
and imprudent processors will be surprised by policy changes and find themselves with 
“significant” overcapacity by the time a policy change occurs.8 Second, processing sec-
tors in most fisheries are far from competitive in ex-vessel markets. Instead, fisheries are 
characterized by small numbers of firms that exercise monopsonistic (single buyer) or 
oligopsonistic (few buyers) control in various local raw product markets.9 This lack of 
5 Testimony of Mr. Joseph Plesha, General Counsel, Trident Seafoods, before the 2004 Senate hearings on sea-
food processor quotas (Plesha 2004).
6 Note that these conclusions are unexceptional in the sense that they apply to any industry in which there is a 
market for a raw input. For example, recent national biofuels policy is diverting raw corn that was previously 
available for corn syrup production into biofuels. If the “stranded capital” argument had any empirical validity, 
we would expect politically powerful corn syrup producers like Archer Daniels Midlands to be protesting that 
their sugar production facilities are “stranded” and that their corn syrup plant assets have been “expropriated” 
by policy changes.
7 The West Coast groundfish fishery has been in the process of rationalizing for many years. The groundfish fleet 
successfully completed a self-financed buyback program in 2003, removing 92 groundfish permits from the 
fleet. 
8 This is why courts have largely been unsympathetic to the “takings” claims of electricity generators who have 
argued that their plants have been devalued by deregulation.
9 In Alaska, inshore pollock processing is split roughly between three firms, including two Japanese multina-
tional conglomerates and Trident Seafoods (Wilen and Richardson 2008). On the West Coast, a single dominant 
firm, Pacific Seafoods, processes much of the whiting and a majority of the groundfish. Stranded Capital 5
competitive environment moderates the development of excess capacity under open ac-
cess.10 The same lack of competition would also foster restraint in the (unlikely) event 
that excess capacity is suddenly generated. Lastly, very little capital in the real world is 
non-malleable (or infinitely durable). Even industries that conduct highly specialized 
processing do so with capital that has alternative uses. As will be discussed below, this is 
a keystone assumption upon which much of the stranded capital claim rests. If processing 
capital is mostly malleable, then policy changes that impact the need for capital are rap-
idly adjusted to by divesting and reconfiguring over a very short adjustment period. This, 
in turn, implies no stranded capital and negligible unanticipated losses in capital value 
and no “expropriation” of assets. In short, without the critical assumption of nonmallea-
ble capital, the entire MMR conceptual apparatus is a straw man, interesting to speculate 
about in theory, but without relevance in the real world of fisheries.   
  Despite the implausibility of the preconditions necessary to support the MMR story, 
the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council (NPFMC) process has nonetheless 
granted special concessions responsive to the hypothesized “expropriation” mechanisms. 
Not coincidentally, these special concessions have been fiercely lobbied for by proces-
sors, and they have protected processors from the normal forces of competition by 
enhancing their bargaining power in the ex-vessel market. For example, rationalization 
of the inshore pollock fishery under the American Fisheries Act (AFA) grants harvester 
quota but requires vessels to partner with processors in cooperatives. This locks in exist-
ing deliveries to their (recent) historical patterns and eliminates vigorous competition in 
the ex-vessel market. The AFA also prohibits inshore pollock purchases by any plants 
other than the seven that historically processed pollock pre-AFA.11
  The second West Coast example of fisheries policy responsiveness to the “expropria-
tion” theory is the so-called “two-pie” system recently implemented in the Alaskan crab 
fishery. This system was conceived by Matulich to help processors protect their bargain-
ing power in the face of what was asserted would be an increase in ex-vessel competition 
for crab under ITQs.12 The NPFMC approved a plan that guaranteed existing proces-
sors 90% of their historical shares of deliveries in various regions. This feature created 
legislatively sanctioned regional monopsonies (single buyers) that both protect existing 
processors from competition from new entrants, and also tilt the balance of bargaining 
power over ex-vessel prices in their favor. Their potential single-buyer status required 
10 In fisheries where delivery contracts are employed to stagger deliveries, it is difficult to argue that there is 
excess capital.  This point was made by a West Coast trawl fishermen Richard Young who testified, “it is abso-
lutely NOT TRUE that excess harvesting capital always leads to excess processing capital. An overcapitalized 
fishery does not always have too much processing capital. I can offer the example of the West coast groundfish 
fishery that I was part of for twenty-five years. This past year, bimonthly trip limits were at extremely low levels 
compared to what we used to catch in this fishery. But many vessels, including mine, did not catch these limits 
because we could not obtain a delivery appointment at the fish plant. West coast fish plants just did not have the 
capacity to process the fish we were capable of bringing them (Young 2004).”
11 Two comments about the AFA remedies are warranted. First, whereas the problem identified by MMR (if 
empirically legitimate at all) is at most a transitional problem resolvable within a short period, the AFA coop 
concessions granted to the processors cause permanent structural distortions. They permanently alter  ex-vessel 
market competition, block prospective entry by new competitors, and influence the nature and kinds of innova-
tions that have typically emerged in other rationalization programs. Second, these special concessions have, 
without question, reduced the rents that would have wound up in harvester ITQ values and transferred those 
rents to processors in the form of higher profits. This may have been the political intent of the concessions in 
the first place. But these distributional transfers have been very costly and inefficient from the perspective of the 
U.S. citizen-owners of the resource. Two-thirds of the inshore pollock processing capacity is owned by Japanese 
multinational firms with the other third owned by the privately held American firm, Trident Seafoods. Thus for 
every three dollars transferred from American harvester ITQ values to processors, two have ended up in Japa-
nese pockets in order to leave the remaining one dollar in the pocket of the owners of Trident Seafoods.
12 According to Matulich, the system “evolved from knowledge gained in the process of developing the litera-
ture” (testimony before Senate hearings on processor quotas). The literature he refers to is the MMR paper that 
hypothesizes that rationalization would generate a “problem” and follow-up pieces that propose “remedies” for 
the alleged problem such as: “1) a split of harvest quota shares between fishers and processors; and 2) a ‘two 
pie’ allocation in which catching rights are awarded to fishers and processing rights are awarded to processors.”Wilen 6
another mechanism to prevent processors from exploiting harvesters, and a complicated 
negotiation process has been mandated to serve as a proxy for the ex-vessel market. 
  The two-pie system has been subject to very heated opposition in Alaska and by 
agencies and high-level political opponents at the federal level. The objection at the fed-
eral level is over the economic inefficiencies associated with reduced competition within 
the processing sector, curtailed entry and exit, inefficient geographic allocation of pro-
cessing and harvesting, and the potential that such complicated and restrictive schemes 
would become precedent.13 Economists have, with the exception of Matulich, roundly and 
universally criticized the two-pie system as replacing one inefficient system (regulated 
open access) with another (regulated monopsonists), with protecting incumbents from 
competition and requiring a complex negotiated price settlement mechanism rather than 
allowing competitive markets to establish ex-vessel prices.14 Some observers of the politics 
of fisheries management believe that the two-pie system created for the crab fishery was a 
one-time fluke, influenced by Senator Stevens’ uniquely powerful position, and that it will 
not be implemented again in any similar form in future fisheries allocation disputes. 
  With a two-pie system off the table, processor lobbyists have returned to the other 
originally proposed MMR remedy for the “expropriation problem,” namely a split of 
initial quota between processors and harvesters. But how can one justify any particular 
split of initial quota?   This question has befuddled many, including Matulich. Testifying 
in 2004, he reports that “Matulich and Sever (1999) formally proved that a split alloca-
tion of IFQs between harvesters and processors and a so-called two-pie allocation (IFQs 
for harvesters and IPQs for processors) assured efficiency and benefited all participants in 
both sectors. However, splitting IFQs between both sectors was deemed problematic. Un-
like the two-pie allocation, splitting harvesting rights is difficult because there is no way 
to determine the split or quota share each sector should receive” (italics added).15 But 
this, of course, is precisely how “stranded capital” enters the picture, as a rationale for 
justifying proposals for initial allocation splits.16    
  The use of stranded capital as a justification for compensation claims mirrors some 
of the tactics being used in electricity deregulation debates. But the two cases differ dra-
matically on the fundamentals. First, in electricity deregulation, much of the approved 
compensation for stranded capital is actually for stranded obligations associated with 
specific requirements that were imposed on generators by regulators, rather than capital 
investments per se.17 There are no counterparts to these kinds of mandated obligations 
in fisheries. Second, where physical capital investments are being compensated, they 
are unusual, highly contested, and mostly cases such as recently constructed nuclear 
power plants. Nuclear power plants are unique in that the capital invested is virtually all 
embedded in the reactor and containment facilities and is highly specialized, immobile, 
and with no alternative uses. Fisheries capital in processing does not share these unique 
characteristics. The third major difference is in the design of the proposed remedies. Spe-
cifically, processor proposals for West Coast fisheries rationalization plans are not, as is 
the case with electricity, asking for temporary surcharges that would directly amortize out 
specific documented compensation claims over a short period. Instead, processors on the 
Pacific Coast are asking for up-front permanent allocations of harvester quota in arbitrary 
amounts unconnected to any empirical assessment of the magnitude of the alleged problem.
13 In the Senate, there was vociferous opposition expressed by Republican Senators including McCain and 
Snowe, but this opposition was eventually overcome by the powerful Alaskan Senator Stevens.
14 See Halvorsen 2004; Milon and Hamilton 2002.
15 Scott Matulich, remarks before Senate hearings on seafood processor quotas (February 2004).
16 While the stranded capital justification may be the intent, the actual proposals put forth for 50 and 25%  of the 
respective allocations of whiting and groundfish contain no documentation that ties the requests to legitimate 
empirical estimates of the so-called problem. 
17 For example, mandated long-term contracts with small-scale “green” electricity suppliers at very favorable 
prices are clearly uneconomic in a more competitive market for power.Stranded Capital 7
Preconditions for stranded Capital
How might regulators assess whether processors have a legitimate case that rational-
ization will, indeed, leave them with stranded capital?  There are two preconditions 
necessary to support a legitimate claim of stranded capital.  First, the reduction in value 
must be clearly attributable to a policy change rather than other background economic 
conditions.18 A second precondition necessary to support a legitimate stranded capital 
claim is that the capital in question must truly suffer a demonstrable reduction in value. In 
this section we discuss how capital values are determined and the likelihood that fisheries 
processors would suffer legitimate losses.   
Determining Capital Value Reductions
How is the value of capital determined?  Candidates that one might first think of include 
purchase costs, book value (purchase costs less computed depreciation), or used market 
values. In general, capital values are determined by the value of the anticipated earnings 
from the equipment over its expected lifetime. In a competitive market for investment 
goods, the price of a new machine will reflect its value in use, which is equal to the pres-
ent value of earnings over the lifetime of the machine. New machines gradually become 
old and require maintenance, wear out, and ultimately need replacement. While machines 
age, there will also be a used market, and used equipment will sell in used markets at 
prices that also reflect anticipated future earnings, adjusted to account for the shorter ex-
pected lifetime and lower productivity. For a business that has a capital stock that matches 
its needs, the earnings from equipment will cover both anticipated replacement costs plus 
a normal rate of return on the capital investment. 
  What happens to a firm that anticipates the need to change its capital equipment?   
Firms that anticipate needing new capital will adjust purchases to match needs, perhaps 
adding new capacity gradually to smooth out adjustment and reduce risk associated with 
misjudging opportunities. For example, processors anticipating growing markets for 
deep skin fillet products might plan and add new lines in step with additional new market 
sales growth. In principle, a firm will treat opportunities for new equipment purchases as 
any other financial investment, asking whether the present value of anticipated earnings 
exceeds new equipment purchase prices; if so, the new equipment would be a candidate 
for purchase. When markets are reduced or when a firm otherwise finds it necessary to 
eliminate equipment held, the process is symmetric. Rational behavior again calls for 
disinvestment decisions that reflect a present value of earnings comparison with the used 
capital price. A firm anticipating a market reduction for a particular product would ask 
whether forecast future (reduced) earnings are below used equipment prices; if so, the 
equipment is a candidate for sale. 
  A firm that has made prudent investments will hold capital that is in balance with 
needs, both current and anticipated needs. Newly purchased capital will have anticipated 
earnings flows that have present values roughly in accord with new capital prices. Used 
equipment will also be held in amounts that reflect the best guesses about future policy 
and environmental events such that anticipated earnings flows of older equipment is 
roughly in accord with used capital prices. For discrete events, such as an anticipated 
implementation of a rationalization plan, savvy entrepreneurs will smoothly adapt so that 
18 This seems obvious, but it is an issue in current West Coast rationalization discussions, particularly in the 
whiting fishery. The whiting fishery has been undergoing structural transformation over the past several years, 
in part associated with pollock rationalization in Alaska. As markets have developed for products other than 
surimi, plants built to process surimi are finding the need to adapt to new market conditions, eliminating surimi 
lines and replacing them with filleting lines and facilities for processing other products. Importantly, this cur-
rently redundant surimi processing capital is not a legitimate stranded capital claim associated with rationaliza-
tion; it is instead associated with normal market forces.Wilen 8
redundant capital is removed and plant structure reflects new needs at the time of imple-
mentation. On the date just before rationalization, the value of a firm’s capital will be the 
sum of all of the values of individual capital, some new and some used. On the date just 
after rationalization, a firm’s capital will be the same (unchanged) value.
   
Specialized Capital and Alternative Uses
Processors promoting concessions as part of rationalization schemes have consistently 
argued that rationalization will make installed capital “nearly worthless.”  The image is 
one of a thriving and prosperous plant worth millions the day before rationalization, and 
a derelict plant worth nothing the day after. This is false. The only components of capital 
that have any chance of being devalued after rationalization are those that have no alterna-
tive use. But virtually all capital has alternative uses, sometimes after modifications to fit a 
new production setting. A machine that is not useful in any particular location can be sold 
on the used market and moved to another location and hence does not become “worthless.”   
In the final analysis, the productivity of a machine in alternative uses determines its value 
in the market, not its particular usefulness at any one place at any point in time. 
  When is a policy change likely to cause a significant reduction in the value of a specific 
piece of capital?  The answer is only when the capital involved is highly specialized and im-
mobile with virtually no alternative uses. This is the situation that the literature refers to as 
“non-malleable” capital; i.e., where capital lacks the flexibility to be utilized in some alterna-
tive activities that are as productive as the original use. But, and this is critical, non-malleable 
capital is very rare in practice. Consider, for example, a processing plant with a filleting 
machine that cuts raw fish. Suppose that a policy change completely eliminates the need for 
the machine at the site in an unanticipated fashion. Then the value reduction would be the dif-
ference between the machine’s pre-policy value at the site in question and the present value 
of earnings in its next best use. But the machine’s pre-policy value would be its used market 
value, and the post-policy value would also be the same used market value reflecting the next 
best use of filleting fish in some other plant at some other location. Importantly, even seem-
ingly specialized equipment like filleting machines will not be “stranded” by policy changes 
in the sense that a unique, immobile, and highly specialized nuclear plant would be. 
measuring stranded Capital Costs
In electricity deregulation, the cases for which investments in generation capacity have 
been compensated are unique; mainly nuclear power plants that have been recently con-
structed (Woo et al. 2003). Nuclear power plants are arguably one of the few examples of 
truly nonmalleable capital.  They are capital intensive, and most of the investment is as-
sociated with the specialized reactor and containment facilities. They are fixed in situ, and 
because of radioactive contamination, not easily dismantled and reinstalled elsewhere. 
The result is that there are no alternative uses and hence their value is determined by 
before- and after-policy conditions. Consider a hypothetical example of a nuclear power 
plant under circumstances in which regulators allow the utility to charge electricity prices 
of 16 cents per kilowatt hour. Suppose that these prices guarantee $160 million in net 
revenues per year. Using an 8% discount rate, the present value of a guarantee of $160 
million per year for an indefinite period is 160/.08 millions, or $2 billion.19 This is what 
19  The general formula for present value computations is:  
                 
where  X is the annual earnings flow, r is the discount rate, and T is the lifetime of the asset. When the lifetime is 
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an investor would be willing to pay to own this nuclear power plant capital, and it would 
be the value of the capital if the regulated prices were legally and contractually guaran-
teed forever. 
  Now suppose that electricity production is deregulated, and competition drives elec-
tricity prices down to 8 cents per kilowatt hour rather than 16. If the plant were mobile, 
the utility could shut the plant down, disassemble it, sell the land and buildings, and move 
to a state where prices were still 16 cents. In that case, there would be only small losses 
due to deregulation associated with the transition costs of relocating the capital elsewhere. 
But for a nuclear plant, this is clearly not an option because the capital is immobile and 
custom built to fit the site. Since the operating costs for nuclear power are low (certainly 
less than 8 cents) the utility would rationally stay in business in situ and continue to use 
the capital as before. This example brings up an important point; no facility will be ratio-
nally shut down because of stranded capital costs. Capital costs undertaken in the past, 
regardless of how large, are “sunk” and have no bearing on whether the plant should 
remain open and in production in the future. As long as revenues under new regula-
tory conditions exceed variable costs, it is rational for any owner to continue production.   
Post-deregulation, a willing buyer for the plant would only pay an amount reflecting the 
new lower earnings, say 80/.08 million, or $1 billion for the plant under deregulated cir-
cumstances. In this case, utilities might argue that they have stranded capital losses of $1 
billion. Successful nuclear plant compensation cases have largely been those in which in-
vestments have been made recently, only partially recovered (or not recovered at all), and 
in regulatory environments where the argument can be made that decision makers were 
surprised by unpredictable regulatory changes or induced by regulators to invest, rather 
than simply imprudent. 
  The experience in electricity deregulation provides important process guidelines that 
are likely to be required if compensation for stranded capital in fisheries is to withstand 
public scrutiny and court challenges. In this section we discuss measuring and bench-
marking stranded capital claims.  
Measuring Policy-induced Capital Value Changes
If compensation is to be made, some measurement of stranded capital losses must be 
provided to legitimize the remedy. How should we go about measuring the amount of 
stranded capital?  Basically there are two approaches that have been implemented in 
electricity deregulation; namely ex ante (before the policy) approaches or ex post (after 
the policy) approaches (Hickey 1998; Hirst 1998). An ex ante approach relies on esti-
mating how much capital is likely to be stranded and the corresponding capital value 
losses, whereas an ex post approach waits to compensate until actual changes have been 
measured. In practice, schemes being developed in electricity deregulation blend the two, 
estimating the most likely effects and then adjusting with “true-up” schemes after mea-
surements of actual post-policy losses have been conducted. The aim of all methods is to 
determine regulation-induced capital losses, sometimes measured as the difference be-
tween the pre-policy book value of designated capital and the post-policy book or actual 
sale value of relevant capital (Maloney, McCormick, and Sauer 1997).20
20 Ideally, book value ought to be close to actual capital value, which should reflect values in alternative uses 
(e.g., used capital markets). Often, however, accounting conventions for computing book value are distorted 
by tax considerations so that book values bear little relation to actual capital values. In electricity deregulation, 
however, the use of book values to estimate pre-policy capital value has not been as problematic as it might be 
in fisheries because book values are also used to compute rate bases, and hence come under much scrutiny to 
assure that they are not inflated.Wilen 10
  Ideally, claimants must show or forecast clear links between the design features of 
the policy in question and the manner in which specific components of capital are expect-
ed to be revalued as a consequence. For example, if a particular product line is eliminated 
because of a policy change, the specialized and nonmalleable portion of equipment used 
to produce that product is a candidate for compensation. Once linkages between particular 
components of capital and the policy are established, the second question is:  How much 
capital value reduction can be ascribed to the policy change? While this seems difficult, 
fortunately the task is simplified because it is not necessary to look at all capital. The po-
tential size of stranded capital losses is related to whether the capital in question is highly 
specialized; that is, whether there are alternative uses for the capital in question. 
The Importance of Alternative Uses
Most capital, whether harvesting or processing capital, has alternative uses and will not 
change value at all after a policy change. The value of pumps, or pressure tanks, or cranes 
or other offloading facilities is basically determined by their value in the next best use. 
For any of these kinds of capital there are obvious next best uses that would generate 
capital prices fully reflecting fair (used) market value, and those prices would be close 
to, or exactly, the same before or after a policy change. For example, a pump that cost 
$1,000 new might be worth $400 as used equipment after some years of use. Suppose 
that a policy eliminates the need for the pump. Before a policy change, the pump’s book 
value would be $400. But after the policy change, the pump would still also be worth 
$400, since its value is determined by alternative uses. Hence even when the pump’s use-
fulness is eliminated by the policy, there is no stranded capital loss. For items that seem 
more specialized, such as a surimi line, again it is the case that their values would not be 
significantly reduced, even by a policy change that made them obsolete. Surimi equip-
ment can be unbolted, moved, and sold on a used market at prices that would be similar 
before or after a policy change.21 Some parts may be adapted to new needs (e.g., conveyer 
belts, sorting tables, and chilling tanks) on site made necessary by product line switches. 
Very little, if any, fishing processing capital qualifies as being so highly specialized that it 
is stranded in place and hence devalued as a result of policy changes.
Benchmarking Estimates   
There are some accounting principles that are useful for putting bounds on potential 
stranded capital losses. First, the maximum losses that might be incurred from stranded 
capital can be no larger than the full book value of an entity. A rough estimate of to-
tal plant value might be made by reviewing the books of firms that contend they are 
candidates for losses. Alternatively, one might use public records (e.g., property tax 
assessments) to estimate the upper bound. For many businesses, land and buildings 
are among the largest components of the firm’s total capital value. But these are not 
components of valid stranded capital computations. Even in the extreme event that the 
business on site closes down, buildings that house processing plants and waterfront land 
clearly have other valuable uses, and these would be immune from rationalization policy 
21 A reviewer raised the possibility that a policy change might influence input markets if, for example, the 
prices of used processing equipment were reduced as a fishery divested of excess machines. This is possible in 
principle, and, if relevant, one would have to include such “non-marginal” effects as a policy impact. There is 
an established literature on the topic (e.g., Dasgupta, Marglin, and Sen 1975). In practice, however the market 
for used processing equipment is global and unlikely to be affected by policies in any single fishery. A quick 
Google search of “Baader fish used” shows just how global the market is; one can find multiple offerings of 
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effects.22 The second step is to subtract land and building values from total values. Third, 
all non-specialized equipment involved in processing must be removed from the list 
of potential strandable capital. This category is likely to be the bulk of on-site capital, 
since it would include vehicles, loading facilities, pumps, conveyors, hoses, and slurry 
lines, etc. In sum, land, buildings, and non-specialized capital values need to be removed 
(subtracted from benchmark values) from consideration as components of potentially 
strandable capital, leaving only the category of specialized capital for which the value 
might be reduced by a policy change.  
  The total book value (not purchase values) of specialized equipment represents an 
upper bound to potential stranded capital losses. A more accurate estimate of potential 
stranded capital losses would require forecasting post-policy values. There may exist 
small amounts of fully specialized capital with very little functional use after a policy 
change, such as custom-made chilling holding tanks built for a particular plant. For these 
items, there would be some minimal salvage value associated with materials; stranded 
capital would be book value less salvage values. For facilities such as excess freezing ca-
pacity, an important issue would be how much capacity was made obsolete by the specific 
policy in question, and whether that temporarily excess capacity was ultimately filled. In 
British Columbia, freezers used to blast freeze halibut during the derby part of the year 
were actually originally built to accommodate salmon.  Thus, excess capacity that ap-
peared after the derby ended could not be considered stranded capital.
  An important conclusion of this walk-through example of how one might bench-
mark maximum possible stranded capital losses is that there is likely to be very little 
processing capital that qualifies as being truly non-malleable. Virtually any capital we 
can imagine that is involved in processing has some alternative uses and is therefore 
malleable. When this is combined with the other observation that in-house specialized 
processing equipment is likely to be swamped by other ineligible components, like land, 
buildings, and fully malleable equipment, the conclusion must be that the likelihood of 
significant amounts of stranded capital is very small.23 One would not expect true, le-
gitimate stranded capital losses to be more than a few percent of book value of on-site 
capital (excluding land and buildings). 
Remedies for addressing stranded Capital
Policy instruments adopted in electricity deregulation treat the problem as a temporary 
transition problem that is addressed within five years or so (Hirst 1998). The favored 
approach for remedying stranded capital is to establish a temporary fund out of which le-
gitimate claims for stranded capital may be paid once such claims are verified. Funds for 
compensation in electricity have come from temporary surcharges on customers; similar 
22 Processing facilities are typically located on waterfront properties that have potentially high value as residen-
tial, retirement, or tourist developments. In many West Coast ports, the waterfronts are on the verge of transition 
from industrial use to other uses. This transition is often delayed in deference to long-standing contributions of 
fishing to local employment. But when processing and fishing related activities are halted, planners are often 
quick to step in and rezone coastal properties for new higher-valued uses. So it is possible (and likely in many 
West Coast ports) that fisheries policies that cause shifts of processing out of ports also trigger rezoning that 
actually makes the waterfront property more valuable than before deregulation. This “stranded benefit” would 
have to be netted out of any claims for stranded costs that resulted from policy changes. 
23 Another important point is that one must evaluate impacts on all of the components and facilities of the pro-
cessing sector to determine the net impacts. While some specialized, non-malleable equipment for one product 
may be eliminated, shifts to other products may actually increase the value of other specialized equipment for 
the alternatives. These increased values would have to be subtracted from the primary loss values. This treat-
ment also pertains to multiple facilities used by a single firm. Losses associated with eliminating non-malleable 
capital at a closed facility would have to be netted out against possible gains in values associated with non-
malleable capital in another location made more valuable as a result of processing location shifts. Points similar 
to these are made in Hackett et al. (2005). Wilen 12
funds in fisheries could be raised from a variety of sources including:  federal or state 
loans; loans from NGOs, philanthropic organizations, or development funds; temporary 
holdbacks and lease auctions of a fraction of harvester IFQs; landings taxes on harvesters 
with IFQs; or transfer taxes at the point of sale of IFQs.
  The size of the fund needed depends upon the size of the expected capital losses. A 
sensible approach would develop a ballpark estimate of the maximum potential stranded 
capital losses (following the procedure above), identifying the elements of specialized 
capital equipment that are expected to be made obsolete or redundant after rationaliza-
tion. Again, these are likely to be on the order of a fraction of depreciated book value of 
highly specialized capital only. If the ballpark estimates seem significant enough, a fund 
could be established using any of the above sources. If compensation is actually imple-
mented, there are good reasons to utilize an ex post compensation scheme or a hybrid 
rather than one implemented upfront as the rationalization is initiated. The reason is that 
compensating before the rationalization (such as a harvester quota allocation to proces-
sors) requires that the remedy be based on estimates of anticipated stranded capital losses 
rather than actual losses. Schemes implemented in electricity have been based on ex post 
demonstration of losses (e.g., either direct asset sales or bundling stranded assets into new 
stock certificates), as well as schemes with some exS ante payment that is adjusted after 
the policy change. The most transparent systems establish and document evidence of pre-
policy book value for capital expected to be harmed and then compensate after evidence 
of post-policy value reduction is substantiated (Hirst 1999).
Process issues
If NOAA decides that there is a political necessity to compensate processors for stranded 
assets, it will be establishing important new economic policy independent of prior and 
related guidance from Congress and the Courts. It would thus be prudent to establish a care-
fully thought out, logical process to guide the valuation and compensation of stranded assets 
rather than attempting to deal with the issue in an ad hoc way as part of the IFQ allocation 
process. Of primary importance is the need for policy makers to select and implement 
policies based on measured losses that do not inefficiently generate transactions costs that 
exceed benefits and that do not create additional inefficient distortions and spillovers.
Legitimizing the Remedy--The Need for Measurement
One principle that is vital in a legitimate and transparent political process is to insist that 
claims for stranded compensation be based on actual estimates or measurement rather 
than assertion or unsubstantiated claims. The most questionable feature of recent dis-
cussions of stranded capital on the West Coast is the complete absence of documented 
quantitative justification for compensation requests being made by the processing sector. 
The compensation requests are implausibly huge, and it is virtually impossible that docu-
mented stranded capital would ever come close to even a small fraction of these amounts. 
For example, my rough estimate of the potential total value that will be generated from 
rationalizing the whiting fishery is approximately $100 million. Proposals to allocate 50% 
of the quota to whiting processors are thus equivalent to a claim of stranded capital losses 
of $50 million. Similarly, I anticipate that the asset value of rationalizing the remainder of 
the groundfish fishery will be approximately $200 million, making the option for a 25% 
processor allocation also equivalent to a $50 million stranded asset claim (see Appendix). 
Even a cursory benchmark estimate of maximum potentially strandable costs would show 
that these remedies are many multiples of plausible actual values.  Stranded Capital 13
Thresholds 
Another policymaking principle that seems essential is to establish some kind of thresh-
old below which it is deemed not worth the transactions costs to deal with stranded 
capital in the political process. As argued earlier, the conditions that are likely to yield 
significantly large stranded capital values appear unlikely in most fisheries. Since the time 
and money costs involved in setting up a process to document stranded capital losses will 
be significant, it makes some sense to require that the processing sector provide an initial 
estimate of potential stranded costs, including a detailed documentation of methodology 
used to generate such estimates before large amounts of additional time are invested by 
the Council process. In the end, important policy questions that arise include:  How high 
must anticipated stranded capital costs be to justify diverting the Council’s time and effort 
to the problem, setting up a legitimate remedy, and forestalling the benefits of rationaliza-
tion?  What circumstances would be required to generate this threshold value?  Are these 
circumstances likely to hold in any particular case in question?
Assessing and Minimizing Spillovers
A last principle that needs consideration in discussion of remedies for potentially 
stranded capital is one of assessing and minimizing spillovers that affect other goals of 
rationalization. Current proposals to address stranded capital by allocating harvester quota 
to processors embody serious procedural irregularities,  the most significant of which is 
that they are arbitrary and unsupported by any empirical substantiation of claims. If these 
proposals are, in spite of the absence of justification, implemented for political reasons, 
they are likely to alter incentives in ways that undermine the fundamental benefits of ratio-
nalization. Two goals are in particular jeopardy, namely reducing bycatch and ecosystem 
effects of fishing and improving incomes by fostering innovation and economic efficiency.
  An important benefit of IFQ management in a mixed-gear multispecies fishery is 
that it generates incentives to avoid bycatch by changing fishing practices, gear modifica-
tions, and cooperation among harvesters. As remaining quota of any particular species 
gets scarce, rising prices automatically generate incentives to avoid these species. When 
harvesters hold quota, the incentives to develop and utilize innovative methods to avoid 
bycatch are maximized because harvester quota holders bear the full financial burden of 
failing to avoid. Moreover, the ability to utilize innovative methods is maximized because 
harvester-owners are closest to the actual point at which decisions to avoid bycatch are 
made. If processors hold quota (as plants and as catch history in processor-owned ves-
sels) the owners are several steps removed from actual decisions that influence bycatch. 
Remuneration systems might be designed to give hired skippers some incentives to re-
duce bycatch, but in the end such systems are indirect and provide only partial incentives. 
These same observations hold for habitat destruction, data fouling, and underreporting. 
Harvesters who hold quota have incentives to observe and self-police each other because 
the impacts of destructive and illegal practices are directly borne by them. Processor own-
ers of harvester quota have similar incentives, but have less direct control over actions 
that actually influence such practices on the grounds.     
  A second major goal of rationalization programs is to remove the financial risk asso-
ciated with the race to fish and replace it with an environment in which maximizing value 
rather than quantity becomes the focus of decisions. Experience with other rationalization 
programs shows that value is generated by innovation up and down the product chain. 
Value is generated as harvesters reduce the costs of landing target species and avoiding 
bycatch with innovative fishing practices and vessel/gear designs. Value is also generated 
as harvesters slow the process of fishing, target particular attributes, develop better han-
dling practices, and time fishing to smooth market swings in ex-vessel prices. Wilen 14
  One of the most important observations emerging from the broad experience with ra-
tionalization worldwide is how much value is generated on the market side of the ledger 
rather than via cost harvester savings and quota consolidation. In the British Columbia 
halibut fishery, entirely new markets were created in cities and retail outlets in the center 
of Canada that had never experienced steady supplies of fresh product. Some of these new 
markets were generated by existing processors, but many were generated by the entry of 
new handlers who, by developing new niches, new product types, and new customers, 
created pure new surplus (Casey et. al. 1995). These market side innovations, more than 
vessel changes and quota consolidations, generated most of the early rent gains in British 
Columbia. Similar market gains have been observed in the New Zealand ITQ fisheries, 
the Australian bluefin tuna fisheries (Geen and Nayar 1988), the Alaskan pollock fishery 
(Wilen and Richardson 2008), Canadian sablefish and groundfish fisheries, and numerous 
others (Homans and Wilen 1995). 
  Upon reflection, we should not be surprised that there are numerous margins across 
which rents can be generated (including markets) once the focus of innovation is directed 
to value rather than quantity (Wilen 1979). Importantly, however, the engine for innova-
tion is vigorous competition in markets up and down the product chain. Competitive 
markets reward innovation by transferring the value of successful new ideas to adopters. 
Harvesters who discover cost-saving ways to reduce bycatch reap the rewards and also 
induce other less innovative fishermen to adopt new methods; processors who develop 
new markets benefit from this market innovation by expanding revenues. But the search 
for new values requires vigorous competition in order to bring out the potential that exists 
for innovation at all levels. Programs designed with special protective, anticompetitive 
provisions risk foregoing benefits that are the main motive for adopting rationalization in 
the first place. Allocation of quota to processors has potential to reduce competition in the 
ex-vessel market, raise barriers to entry, and bestow incumbent advantages that forestall 
the kind of vigorous innovation in markets responsible for generating so much of the 
value created in past rationalization programs.
summary and Discussion
Current policy proposals for processor quota allocations are based on the unsubstantiated 
assertion that rationalization will leave processors with enormous amounts of uncompen-
sated stranded capital costs. This article argues that rationalization of fisheries is unlikely 
to generate substantial stranded capital costs for processors. Most of the capital involved 
in fisheries processing will not be devalued in the transition to a harvester quota system; 
hence the preconditions for stranded capital are absent. In addition, current proposals 
are likely to reduce competition within the ex-vessel market, block potential entry, and 
reduce competition among processors so that some of the market-side benefits that have 
emerged in other rationalization programs are stalled or foregone. 
  In light of these negative findings, our recommendation is that if stranded capital is to 
be addressed at all for political or other reasons,  a cautious, staged approach is warranted. 
In the first stage, ballpark estimates of the maximum potential possible stranded capital 
should be made using verifiable accounting information provided by potential claimants and 
following agreed-upon procedures for identifying potentially strandable capital. In the sec-
ond stage, once ballpark estimates are compiled, a decision should be made about whether 
the estimates of most probable total claims justify moving ahead with policy schemes to 
compensate. If it is judged that potential claims warrant incurring the transactions costs, the 
third stage would be to establish an appropriately sized fund out of which claims are to be 
paid. In the fourth post-rationalization stage, processors would present claims with docu-
mentation to legitimize capital losses and request compensation. After compensation was 
completed (in a short period of time), the fund could be closed and the residual dispersed.Stranded Capital 15
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Estimating potential IFQ values before rationalization policies are initiated is a difficult 
task. There are several approaches that one might take ex ante, including calibrating 
programming models of representative vessels and interviewing knowledgeable partici-
pants to determine consensus predictions. The most prevalent approach uses econometric 
analyses of production and/or cost relationships of the pre-policy fleet. Estimated produc-
tion/cost functions are then used to forecast how changes in incentives will alter input 
decisions and hence costs and profits (Dupont 2000).  Econometric results can be used 
to characterize the most efficient fleet configuration and potential IFQ values associated 
with fleet reconfiguration and consolidation gains (Squires and Kirkley 1996). Econo-
metric cost studies may miss important components of the gains from rationalization. For 
example, they do not address gains that might accrue from changes in revenues associ-
ated with the production of higher-valued end products. These market-side gains appear 
to be “low hanging fruit” that emerges quickly after rationalization, and they can be sub-
stantial, on the order of 20-50% of pre-rationalization prices and revenues (Homans and 
Wilen 2005). A comprehensive ex ante analysis would need to forecast market impacts 
of IFQ incentives and integrate those with cost and production side impacts. Similarly, 
econometric cost studies miss other management gains that emerge from removing the 
race to fish, such as overly conservative management of primary targets. One benefit of 
IFQ programs is that they can allow more accurate management of both target and by-
catch species in mixed-species fisheries. This may generate significant gains as TACs can 
be fully harvested without overages or premature closures associated with bycatch. 
  An alternative to detailed econometric analysis is to find comparable fisheries that 
have been rationalized and use their experience to impute values for fisheries about to be 
rationalized. We use this second approach here, borrowing experience from the British 
Columbia groundfish and hake rationalization programs.  
BC Groundfish Program
Beginning with the 1997 season, the BC groundfish fleet began operating under an IFQ 
program that required both observer coverage and transferable individual quotas for all 
targeted and bycatch species.  The BC groundfish trawl fishery is similar to the Pacific 
Coast groundfish trawl fishery in many respects, about as close as a “control group” as one 
might find in terms of vessels, fishing operations, etc. Turris (Grafton et al. 2007) reports 
2003/2004 groundfish IFQ sale prices averaging $3.00 per pound. These are prices for 
“uncut groundfish,” essentially the mixed species bundle that was allocated to original 
participants. It includes many of the same  species caught in the Pacific Coast groundfish 
fishery, including flatfish and soles, as well as similar deeper water fish, such as Dover sole 
and thornyheads. It also includes quantities of halibut and sablefish needed to cover his-
torical bycatch amounts, although halibut bycatch may not be retained in the BC fishery. 
Pacific Coast Groundfish
As a rough estimate of what might emerge after the Pacific Coast groundfish trawl fish-
ery is rationalized, assume that the Pacific fleet complex IFQ quota sale prices mimic 
the BC case, equilibrating at $3.00 per round weight pound. Over the 1998-2005 period, 
total Pacific Coast groundfish landings (less whiting landings) averaged 32,000 metric 
tonnes round weight, or approximately 70 million pounds (PFMC 2008). A conservative 
total license value estimate for the fishery thus might be on the order of $210 million. 
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to compensation on the order of $50 million. One might discount this to account for 
Canadian/U.S. exchange rates (about 0.85 in late 2004), but one might also increase it to 
account for anticipated total allowable catch gains associated with rebuilding of overhar-
vested species. In addition, quota prices from the BC case are for shares of the original 
bundled mix of groundfish species. Shares trade for bundled and unbundled quota. Lease 
and sale prices for unbundled quota are considerably higher; hence the estimates here are 
conservative and a lower bound, if other conditions are equal. An alternative approach 
would begin with annual lease prices, reported at 25 cents per pound in 2003/2004, on 
a base ex-vessel price of about 75 cents per pound round weight (Nelson 2006b). This 
75 cent figure represents post-program ex-vessel prices in BC, the base from which to 
compute rents at an apparent rate of 33%. On the Pacific Coast during the same period, 
ex-vessel prices averaged about 64 cents per pound round weight for the species mix off 
the coast. Assume a modest increase in post-program ex-vessel prices due to marketing 
gains of 15% so that ex-vessel prices rise to 74 cents. Then rents per pound would be 
.33*0.74 or 24.4 cents per pound in lease value on the Pacific Coast. These annual values 
must be capitalized since they are expected to be earned in perpetuity; using a multiple of 
12 gets us about $2.93 which is close to the $3 value and the $200 million total ground-
fish quota value. 
British Columbia Hake Fishery
The BC hake fishery was also rationalized using an IFQ program in 1997. Market condi-
tions for products made from hake have improved recently, and BC license sale values in 
2006 were 60 cents per pound (Nelson 2006a). Alternatively, lease values have averaged 
5 cents per pound in recent years.
Pacific Coast Whiting Fishery
The shoreside whiting fishery averaged close to 80,000 MT during the 1998-2005 period 
(PFMC 2008), or 176 million pounds. Using BC hake license sale prices of 60 cents per 
pound as a proxy, the estimated value of continued shoreside quotas of this level would 
be $105 million. Alternatively, one could use annual lease values of 5 cents per pound in 
BC, capitalize these by multiplying by 12, yielding the same value of just over $100 mil-
lion. Proposals to allocate 50% of the nearshore whiting quota for stranded capital claims 
are thus equivalent to claims on the order of $50 million.  